The growth of the multinational hotel industry: 1946 to the 1960s. by Quek, Mary
1 
 
15
th
 Annual Conference of the European Business History Association  
24-26 August, 2011 
Athens, Greece 
 
Work in progress.   
 
The growth of the multinational hotel industry: 1946 to the 1960s. 
Mary Quek 
University of Hertfordshire 
m.j.quek@herts.ac.uk 
 
 
Introduction 
Historically, compared to research on the internationalisation of the service sector, such as 
the areas of banking, auditing, communication and management consultancy, only limited 
studies have been undertaken on the hotel sector.  One reason why so little has been written 
about hotel internationalisation is that there are significant problems relating to the 
definition of the word ‘hotel’ both as a term and a sector.  The hotel business shares the 
same capital-intensive nature as the manufacturing industry, but the latter was able to 
measure productivity easily through the tangible products it produced.  In the case of the 
hotel, although the capital-intensive nature of hotels lies in a considerable investment in 
fixed assets such as buildings, land and extensive furnishings, fittings and equipment 
(Guilding, 2009), hotel operations can be more complex than the tangible image portrayed.  
The intangible nature of the hotel industry complicates performance and growth 
measurement.  Broadly, a hotel provides services such as food, beverages and 
accommodation and is a form of business. 
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Traditionally, a large hotel has had to coordinate the provision of a range of hospitality 
services, in addition to rooms, including the sales of food and beverages, laundry and other 
retailing business within the hotel premises (Guilding, 2009).  In addition, the hotel 
business depends on the simultaneous consumption and production nature of rendering 
hotel services (Clancy, 1998; Enderwick, 1989); and the heterogeneous nature of the 
interactions between providers and guests make it difficult to provide an accurate 
measurement of productivity or comparable business performance.   
 
Although the historical development of current international hotel chains - Intercontinental 
Hotel Group, Hilton Hotel Corporation (HHC), Marriott International Inc., Starwood 
Hotels & Resorts and their portfolio developments such as Intercontinental Hotels, Hilton 
International, JW Marriott Hotels & Resorts and Sheraton Hotels respectively – has been 
discussed in trade journals and books, an in-depth analysis of the reasons driving such a 
frenzy of internationalisation of hotel chains after the Second World War (WWII) have 
been less explored.  The question addressed in this paper is: What drove hotel companies to 
expand overseas after WWII?  This paper employs two case studies of the two pioneering 
hotel chains that lead the internationalisation process after WWII to examine the drivers of 
such process: the Intercontinental Hotel Corporation (IHC) and the Hilton Hotel 
International (HHI).  Archival documents and secondary data were collected to conduct this 
study.  The next section reviews the drivers of multinational hotel growth with reference to 
IHC and HHI.  The final section presents the conclusion for this paper.   
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The Drivers of Multinational Hotel Growth  
The growth of multinational hotel companies emerged after WWII, driven mainly by the 
US-based hotel companies.  The main determinants found driving such growth were US 
foreign policy, and the growth of the airline and related tourist industries.  In the late 1940s, 
many countries in different regions were recovering from the aftermath of WWII.  Two 
regions possessed the opportunity for business development and were attractive to the US 
government: Latin America and Europe.  It was believed that tourists and their expenditure 
was the ‘only source of revenue that could possibly be harvested in amounts large enough 
to be of immediate aid’ to these economies (Friedlander, 1949: 66).  The US government 
deployed foreign aid to reach out to these regions to help them recover from WWII 
damages, in turn, creating trading markets for itself.   
 
The US Government was interested in the Latin American hotel projects for reasons 
including the promotion of travel between the two continents to solidify their relationships; 
facilitating business travel and penetrating the Latin-American market; and injecting US 
dollars into the Central and South American nations via a policy of increasing the number 
of American tourists to these countries (New York Times, 1947a).  Juan T. Trippe (Trippe), 
CEO of Pan America World Airlines (Pan Am) was assigned by the (then) US President 
Franklin Roosevelt (President Roosevelt) to survey the situation in Latin America and it 
was found that a shortage of decent accommodation discouraged business and tourist travel 
into those regions (Pan American, 1961).  At the time, however, there were no US 
companies willing to participate in establishing hotels in Latin America, and President 
Roosevelt asked Trippe to develop 5,000 hotel rooms in some 20 countries south of the US 
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border (Potter, 1996). Trippe formed IHC in 1946, as a subsidiary of Pan Am, with the 
intention of developing these hotels.  In addition to receiving financial support from Pan 
Am, IHC also obtained some financial support from the Export-Import Bank, with the help 
of the government.  The Export-Import Bank was created under the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation (RFC) to finance US export sales (Potter, 1996).  The agreement allowed each 
hotel owning company designated by Pan Am a maximum loan amount of $25,000,000 on 
the condition of a 20-year repayment period and a two-year moratorium from its first draw-
down of funds (Pan American, 1945).  The Export-Import Bank also limited the loan to 
50% of the cost of equipment, materials, supplies and services in the respective hotels.  In 
addition, the hotels had to pay interest at the rate of 4% per annum on outstanding balances.  
Furthermore, either the Government of the country within which the hotel was to be 
constructed or an accredited banking institution had to guarantee unconditionally the 
repayment of advances against any line of credit established between the Export-Import 
Bank and the hotel units concerned.   
 
Similarly, HHC started its internationalisation process after WWII, driven by US foreign 
policy.  In 1947, Conrad Hilton was approached by the US government to explore the 
possibility of creating a chain of Hilton Hotels in Europe as part of the Marshall Plan 
programme (Maximaxims, 1951).  The Marshall Plan set the goals of generating $2 and 
$2.5 billion through tourist receipts from Americans travelling to Europe between 1950 and 
1954 (Friedlander, 1949). The Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), created by 
the Marshall Plan, was to oversee the economic and technical assistance programmes 
extended to help a few selected European countries to re-generate their economies.  These 
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programmes included an ECA fund
 
allocated for European hotel development, contributed 
by the US State Department, which required a repayment rate of 2% below market rate 
(HHI, 1952; Pearson, 1949).   
 
Agreeing with the US government’s views on using tourism to generate economic growth, 
foreign governments helped to boost the tourism industry by eliminating extensive 
paperwork for tourist visa applications.  A number of European countries abolished visa 
requirements for short-term travellers from the US by late 1948 (Friedlander, 1949).  
Similarly, many countries in the Caribbean eliminated visa requirements after 1949, 
especially for US citizens, to facilitate the movements of tourists between national borders 
(New York Times, 1954). On the other hand, unlike most European and Caribbean 
countries, the majority of South American governments required tourists to carry visas, 
except for Mexico, which required a tourist card and passport (Szulo, 1954).  The 
restrictions implemented by South American governments could have been one reason 
among many that slowed down international tourist growth, and had an impact on the 
differences between IHC’s and HHI’s financial performance (to be discussed later in this 
section).   
 
Presented with the pull from business opportunities arising in Europe due to the need to 
repair buildings in anticipation of the arrival of American tourists (Friedlander, 1949) and 
the push exerted by US foreign policy, Conrad Hilton created HHI to expand overseas.  
HHI was established as a subsidiary of HHC with the original funding of $500,000 and was 
expected to depend on further sources of finance to develop its international hotel 
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programme.  Despite being invited to develop a hotel chain in Europe under ECA funding, 
HHI did not subsequently develop any hotels through this fund.  The reasons were a lack of 
cooperation from the ECA people in Europe and the end of the Marshall Plan in 1951 in 
conjunction with the Vietnam War (1950 – 1953) resulting in the withdrawal of funds made 
available for hotel developers (HHI, 1952).  Between 1949 and 1966, HHI operated 24 
hotels (see Table 1).  HHI’s first international hotel was built in Spain in 1953 and 
subsequent hotels were established in Latin America, North America (Canada), the 
Caribbean, and Middle East regions.   In the same period, IHC established 35 hotels (see 
Table 1).  The chain concentrated on Latin America and the Caribbean islands between 
1949 and 1956, and only established its first IHC hotel outside those regions, in the Middle 
East region, in 1961 (Potter, 1996). Europe in the early 1950s was not a prioritised region 
for expansion of IHC, as most European capitals were deemed to be densely operated by 
existing small and medium-sized hotels (Potter, 1996).   
 
The boom in the airline industry, driven by airline technology advancement and related 
tourism growth, was another determinant for facilitating multinational hotel growth.  From 
the 1940s, technology in the airline industry advanced exponentially, contributing to shorter 
flight times.  For instance, it took six days to fly between San Francisco (USA) and Manila 
(Philippines) in 1935, but it only took an overnight journey to fly across the Pacific in 1960 
(PAWAIAR, 1960).  The US deregulation that allowed more foreign-flag airlines to 
increase their operations between the US and world destinations after WWII intensified the 
competition between US airlines and reduced their revenue and earnings (Barnum, 1998).  
At the same time, it was difficult for US airlines to compete with other unregulated state-
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owned foreign-flag airlines, which obtained financial support from their governments and 
were unrestrained over their pricing and routes (Button, 1998; New York Times, 1959; 
PAWASAR, 1945).   
 
Following the intensified competition, the costs of air tickets became more affordable 
particularly with the introduction of tourist class tickets.  Pan Am was the first airline 
company to launch tourist class tickets in September 1948, operating between New York 
and San Juan, priced at $75, for a one-way ticket, which was 30% cheaper than the usual 
first class ticket (PAWASAR, 1948; PAWAIAR, 1952; 1953).  This move was followed by 
Trans World Airlines (TWA) in October 1948 and other airlines (Pan American, 1954) 
which further hastened the rate of change in international tourism development.   
 
Complementing the airline technology and pricing change was the combination of 
economic and socio-cultural changes.  After WWII, US companies became leaders in their 
industries and the US dollar emerged as the world's major reserve currency (Jones, 2005) 
driving the increased demand for international tourism among the American middle class.  
In 1950, 12 million families in the US had disposable income after taxes of at least $4,000 
and this figure rose to an estimated 36 million in 1960 (Pan American, 1956). Consumer 
expenditure on foreign travel by US residents also rose between 1947 and 1959.  For 
example, the dollar amount spent by American travellers increased from $688 million in 
1947 to $853 million in 1948, and $1.61 billion in 1959 (Friedlander, 1949; New York 
Times, 1947b).  The percentage of US overseas journeys via air also rose exponentially 
between 1950 and 1955
. 
 For instance, 31.4% of American passengers travelled by air in 
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1950, and this figure increased to 70% by 1955 (PAWAIAR, 1951; 1955).  As a result of 
international tourism growth, a greater demand for hotel rooms arose worldwide.   
 
The foreign government policy and airline industry no doubt were important drivers of 
multinational hotel growth.  Factors internal to the individual companies also played some 
influential role in facilitating such growth.  This will be reviewed in the light of IHC’s and 
HHI’s financial performances.  Despite entering the international hotel market at about the 
same time, the financial performances of IHC and HHI showed striking differences 
between 1949 and 1964
1
 (see Table 2).  HHI was making profits throughout its overseas 
operations while IHC only made a profit for the first time in 1954, and incurred quite 
significant losses throughout the period under discussion.  Three reasons are considered for 
such asymmetric performance in the companies’ internationalisation processes: the hotel 
locations, the business models and the management experience. 
 
Firstly, IHC’s first few hotels were located in Latin America, a region that incurred a 
financial loss between 1950 and 1953, mainly as a result of numerous episodes of political 
unrest and economic problems.  During the periods of unrest, IHC was operating, 
constructing or negotiating in Chile, Columbia, Uruguay, Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, 
Peru, Ecuador, Guatemala and Mexico (Matthews, 1952; Pan American, 1948; Pan 
American, 1951).  Although IHC’s profit saw some improvement after 1954 due to a major 
re-organisation of the company, the financial situation continued to be affected by external 
                                                          
1
 This comparison stops at 1964 because HHI was spun off in 1964.  Moreover, with the 
advent of the jet age, more US hotel chains have developed outside of the American 
continent and increased competition in the international hotel industry by then. 
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political problems.  For example, in December 1958, Fidel Castro took over Cuba and the 
political unrest deterred people from visiting the country.  Subsequently, American-owned 
or -operated businesses were expropriated, including those of IHC and HHI (Phillips, 
1960).  HHI also incurred its first financial loss in 1958 caused by the political unrest in 
Cuba; however, the overall loss for HHI was smaller compared to the loss suffered by IHC.  
It is apparent that HHI’s diversified geographical presence enabled the company to reduce 
investment risk derived from the political unrest which IHC was facing. 
 
IHC’s initial choices of hotel location in Latin America were prescribed in response to the 
government foreign policy.  In 1959, with the advent of the jet age, Pan America was 
concerned that its new jet aeroplanes might be flying empty seats to areas of the world that 
did not have decent accommodation to attract visitors.  Consequently, IHC’s locations were 
identified and proposed by Pan Am’s regional divisions (Atlantic, Latin America and 
Pacific) (Pan American, 1959).  In contrast to IHC’s internationalisation venture which 
started with strong intentions for a noble venture, HHI’s motivation was grounded on 
business opportunity and profitability from the start (HHI, 1948), which explained in part 
the reasons for such disparity in financial performance.  Conrad Hilton believed that the 
business opportunities available in Europe were beneficial for HHC’s growth and 
persuaded his Board of Directors to expand into the region despite their reluctance to 
commit because of their worries about ‘war’, ‘revolution’ and ‘inflation’ (Hilton, 1957: 
234).   
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Secondly, the business models adopted by IHC and HHI did not only account for the 
differences in financial performance between the two companies; they also played a critical 
role in providing insight into the drivers of international hotel growth.  IHC’s business 
model for international mode of entry started as management contracts because of 
regulations imposed in countries that the company expanded into (Potter, 1996).  For 
instance, it was believed that ‘the civil code of most Latin American countries, which was 
based on the laws of Napoleon, gave special rights of tenancy to lessee: thus it could be 
difficult to expand into this region via the leasing method’ (Potter, 1996: 20).  Although 
management contracts enabled a company to expand with a minimum equity investment, 
IHC did not make use of this advantage.  Instead, the company invested substantial equity 
in each of its ventures, due to the decision made by Pan Am to take part of the equity in 
order to show other shareholders and investors IHC’s confidence in their own management.   
 
In contrast to IHC, HHI’s financial commitment was limited to the provision of operating 
capital, and local government or private companies invested in individual hotel properties. 
One of the reasons was due to HHI holding a well established reputation as a hotel 
operator.  The other reason was ascribed to HHI’s founder, Conrad Hilton’s management 
approach.  Although Conrad Hilton was enthusiastic about hotel internationalisation, he 
was cautious not to commit huge capital investments and risk.  HHI’s robust financial 
performance stemmed from its clearly set out lease model which the company held onto for 
many years.  The model was based on a ‘2/3 and 1/3’ lease contract, meaning the hotel 
owner(s) received two thirds of generated profit, and HHI received one third
 
(HHI, 1959).  
This method was adopted after HHI’s first expansion beyond the North American continent 
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- the Caribe Hilton Puerto Rico, which successfully generated $102,963 in net profit in the 
first year of operation (1949 -1950) (HHI, 1960) and continued to show positive returns in 
subsequent years (see Table 2).   
 
Generally, leasing incurs higher costs than management contracts as the nature of the latter 
lies in minimum equity investment and only involves working capital for daily operations 
(Uttam, 1984).  Although the lease model employed by HHI was able to sustain a constant 
growth for its international expansion, the loss incurred by its Cuban venture eventually 
steered HHI towards the management contracting mode, in recognition of the benefits to 
expansion without committing high capital cost, as well as enabling the company to retain 
its operations and reputation.  Ultimately, this entry mode entailing low capital risk played 
a driving role in incentivising hotel companies to expand overseas.   
 
Thirdly, management experience was the other major cause of the profitability difference 
between HHI and IHC.  The nature of their original business and management teams played 
an important role in this instance.  HHI originated from a US domestic hotel company and 
was led by Conrad Hilton, whose 27 years of hotel operation experience, combined with his 
centrally controlled operating style, became an advantage for HHI during the 
internationalisation process.  HHI also formed a special Operating Committee, comprising 
three senior executives and headed by Conrad Hilton, to make important decisions about its 
development (HHI, 1947).  Conrad Hilton was also the President of both HHC and HHI, 
which enabled important decisions to be made quickly regarding HHI’s development. 
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In contrast to HHI’s board of directors which was selected from a pool of management with 
prior hotel operating experience, IHC was conceived by a US international airline 
company.  The management team of IHC’s operations was overseen by directors who held 
responsibilities on both Pan Am and IHC boards.  However, Pan Am did bring in Lucius 
Boomer (Boomer), the only experienced hotel operator, to start and grow IHC.  Boomer did 
not have full control of IHC expansion.  The fact that most of the directors of IHC were 
airline personnel and not hoteliers enabled Pan Am to play a major role in deciding IHC’s 
locations and business partner-seeking process.  Therefore, it is argued that the location 
selections, business models adopted, and management experience reflected to some extent 
the determinants or deterrents which drove or delayed the international hotel growth.   
 
Conclusion  
In conclusion, the determinants found for the growth of multinational hotel chains was 
initiated by the foreign policies, stemming from the fact that the US government wanted to 
build a good relationship with its neighbour, Latin America, and extend its trade aid to war-
torn European countries at the end of WWII; and the pull by host governments had the 
effect in part of growing tourism and the hotel internationalisation process.  Moreover, the 
timing of a shortage of foreign currency amongst these countries, specifically of US dollars, 
and the need for US dollars to facilitate imports, presented the US government with the 
opportunity to improve its international social and economic relationship with them, and 
form a symbiotic relationship.  In conjunction with governments’ motivation, the rise of the 
wealth of the American economy and the increase in the middle-income population further 
stimulated demand for travel.  These economic and social changes coincided with the 
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improvements in airline technology, and the emergence of shorter flight time and cheaper 
air tickets.  The interaction of these events resulted in international tourism growth and 
drove the need for countries to provide quality accommodation in order to meet the demand 
capacity and attract visitors.   
 
One major cause of financial loss in the hotel internationalisation process was its high 
dependence on political and economic conditions.  This cause illuminates the high risks and 
difficult decisions hotel companies must face in order to become multinational.  The 
physical hotel product makes it difficult for hotel companies to quickly adapt purpose-built 
rooms to suit changes in political climate and market demand.  In addition, their 
simultaneous production and consumption feature by definition requires hotels to be 
physically present in several locations to generate business, compelling hotel operators to 
take risks despite the knowledge of political risks which could lead to expropriation and 
decline in demand.  This study presents the analysis of the determinants of hotel 
multinational growth, filling the void in the limited literature on their multinational growth.  
Not dissimilar to other service sector studies, this paper illuminates the roles of 
governments and the motivation of hotel multinationals in following another industry, 
specifically the airline sector, into the international domain.    
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Table 1: HHI's & IHC's International hotels development, 1949 - 1964 
HHI IHC 
  Hotel name City/ Country   Hotel name City/ Country 
   
1949 Grande Hotel Belem/Brazil 
   
1950 Carrera Hotel Santiago/Chile 
      1950 El Prado Intercontinental  Barranquilla/Colombia 
      1952 Reform Intercontinental   Mexico City/Mexico  
1953 Castallana Hilton Madrid/Spain 1953 Victoria Plaza Montevideo/Uruguay 
      1953 Princess hotel Hamilton/Bermuda 
      1953 Tequedama Intercontinental Bogota/Colombia 
      1953 De Lago Intercontinental Maracaibo/Venezuela 
      1953 Tamanaco Intercontinental Caracas/Venezuela 
1955 Istanbul Hilton Istanbul/Turkey       
1956 The Continental Hilton Mexico City/Mexico 1956 Nacional de Cuba Havana/Cuba 
1957 El Panama Hilton Panama City, Panama 1957 Jaragua Intercontinental Santo Domingo/Domincan Republic 
      1957 Embajador Intercontinental Santo Domingo/Domincan Republic 
      1957 Curacao Intercontinental Curacao/Netherlands Antilles 
      1957 Varadero Oasis Varadero Beach/Cuba 
1958 Queen Elizabeth  Montreal/Canada  1958 El Salvador Intercontinental San Salvador/El Salvador 
1958 The Berlin Hilton West Berlin/Germany 1958 El San Juan Intercontinental San Juan/Puerto Rico 
1958 Habana Hilton Havana/Cuba       
1959 Nile Hilton Cairo/Egpyt       
1959 Las Brisas Hilton Las Britsas/Mexico       
1960 The Virgin Isle, Hilton 
St Thomas/ US Virgin 
Islands 1960 El Ponce Intercontinental Ponce/Puerto Rico 
1960 Royal Hilton Teheran/Iran       
   
1961 Phoenicia Intercontinental Beirut/Lebanon 
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HHI IHC 
 
Hotel name City/ Country 
 
Hotel name City/ Country 
1962 
Hilton International 
Trinidad Port of Spain/Trinidad  1962 Ducor Intercontinental Monrovia/Liberia 
1962 Amsterdam Hilton Amsterdam/Netherlands 1962 Hotel Indonesia Jakarta/Indonesia 
      1962 
Southern Cross  
Intercontinental Melbourne/Australia 
1963 
Hilton International 
London  London/UK 1963 Dublin Intercontinental Dublin/Ireland 
1963 Athens Hilton Athens/Greece 1963 Cork Intercontinental Cork/Ireland 
1963 
Hilton International 
Rotterdam Rotterdam/Netherlands 1963 Limerick Intercontinental Limerick/Ireland 
1963 
Cavalieri Hilton 
International Rome/Italy 1963 Frankfurt Intercontinental Frankfurt/Germany 
1963 Hong Kong Hilton Hong Kong 1963 Ivoire Intercontinental Abdidjan/Ivory Coast 
1963 Tokyo Hilton Tokyo/Japan 1963 Singapura Intercontinental Singapore/Singapore 
1963 Dorado Hilton  Dorado, Puerto Rico 1963 Mandarin Hotel Hong Kong 
1963 Jamaica Hilton  Ocho Rios/Jaimaca       
1963 
Montreal Aeroport Hilton 
International Montreal/Canada        
1964 Hotel Vancouver  Vancouver/Canadan 1964 Intercontinental Jordan Amman/Jordan 
1964 
Hilton International 
Mayaguez Mayaguez/Puerto Rico 1964 Intercontinental Wien Vienna/Austria 
      1964 Intercontinental Geneva Geneva/Switzerland 
      1964 Intercontinental Jerusalem Jerusalem/Israel 
      1964 Karachi Inter-continental  Karachi/Pakistan 
      1964 Okura Hotel Tokyo/Japan 
      1964 Esplanade Intercontinental Zegred/Yugoslavia 
 
Source: HHCAR various years; HHI (1965); PAWAIAR & PAWASAR various years; Potter (1996). 
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Table 2: HHI's & IHC's net profit (US$), 1950-1964 
  HHI IHC 
1950 102,963 -305,000 
1951 243,855 -229,000 
1952 295,368 -347,000 
1953 386,351 -340,000 
1954 489,952 235,000 
1955 688,315 286,000 
1956 909,922 497,000 
1957 992,468 301,000 
1958 637,512 -345,000 
1959 935,898 -478,000 
1960 1,260,012 -246,000 
1961 1,151,572 111,000 
1962 1,266,000 -245, 000 
1963 1,503,000 -345, 000 
1964 1,449,000 491,000 
 
Source: HHCAR (1961); HHIAR (1964); HHI (1965); HHI (1967); Pan American (1971). 
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